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The effects of personal income tax changes are usually analyzed by comparing the in-
equality of income distributions before and after the tax policy change on a fixed pretax
income distribution. This constant-population methodology aims at isolating the ‘‘pure’’
redistributive effect of the tax legislation. On the basis of the OECD’s 1987 analysis, this
paper proposes a methodology to disentangle the pure effect of tax changes from the
influence of other nontax factors when the pretax income distribution is not fixed.
For the Italian case, it is shown that the additional redistributive outcome displayed by
changes of tax laws between 1995 and 2000 is only one-fourth of the total change of
the redistributive impact in the same period and is outweighed by the effect of infla-
tionary fiscal drag.
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1. Introduction
The analysis of the effects of the personal income tax has a long history both
in Italy and in other countries. In Italy, this analysis has been at the core of
the economic debate since the introduction of the income tax in the seventies
of the past century. In other countries, the evaluation of the effects of income
tax reforms on inequality, progressivity, social welfare, and/or tax revenues
has also attracted a significant amount of empirical analysis.1
The greatest part of it, however, has followed two approaches in assessing
such reforms. The first has been that of measuring inequality, social welfare,
progressivity, and/or the level of tax revenues before and after the policy
* We wish to thank two anonymous referees and the editor Alfons J. Weichenrieder for
their many insightful comments on previous versions of this paper. Comments from
participants to the First Meeting of the Society for the Study of Economic Inequality
(ECINEQ), Palma de Mallorca, July 2005, are also gratefully acknowledged. The usual
disclaimer applies.
1 Studies on this topic are many. A complete survey of them is beyond the scope of this
paper. A large number of references can be found in Lambert (2002), Messere (1999),
Slemrod (1996), Creedy (1996), and the recent OECD (2006).
FinanzArchiv 64 (2008), 87--114 doi: 10.1628/001522108X312087
ISSN 0015-2218 © 2008 Mohr Siebeck
Francesca Gastaldi, Paolo Liberati, and Chiara Rapallini88
change on the basis of a fixed pretax income distribution. This methodology,
assuming a constant population, has aimed at isolating what has been called
the pure redistributive effect of tax changes.2 The second strategy has focused
on the measurement of inequality, social welfare, progressivity, and/or the
level of tax revenues arising from different tax regimes, using a variable
pretax income distribution.
Both strategies have shortcomings: the first, while useful for analyzing the
impact of tax reforms, does not fit well into the analysis of redistribution
over large time intervals, where a fixed pretax income distribution becomes
a hardly tenable assumption, unless one is interested in comparing the po-
tential outcomes of different tax systems.3 The second, instead, conflates the
effects of tax and nontax factors, giving rise to possible over- or underevalua-
tion of the redistributive effect of tax changes, depending on how the pretax
income distribution has changed.
This paper innovates in this respect by implementing a third strategy,
which aims at disentangling the effects of tax and nontax factors on the total
redistributive outcomes of different tax regimes in a context where the pretax
income distribution is not fixed.
On this issue, in our view, the existing literature lacks a clear methodology.
To this purpose, we make recourse to a decomposition developed by OECD
(1987), where some nontax factors (potentially affecting the pretax income
distribution) were identified: the growth of average income; the way in which
income is distributed; real and inflationary fiscal drags; the change in the
number of taxpayers.
The growth of average income may affect the amount of tax revenue col-
lected and in this way the degree of total redistribution at a given point in
time. The way in which pretax income is distributed may make a given tax
system more or less progressive – showing a different after-tax inequality
even in the absence of tax changes. Fiscal drag effects due to real or infla-
tionary income growth may change the progressivity of the income tax if
these incomes rise into higher brackets and are subject to additional taxes
in real terms. Finally, a change of the number of taxpayers may change the
pretax distribution of income as well as average income.
It is worth noting that OECD (1987) confined itself to explaining changes
in tax revenue. In this paper, the same methodology is first applied to changes
in tax revenue and then extended to encompass redistributive issues. This
is done by considering personal income tax changes that occurred in Italy
2 See Redmond and Sutherland (1995). In this case, “pure” means that the change of the
redistributive effect is entirely attributed to tax changes, as the pretax income distribution
is fixed. However, one must recall that the vertical effect of the tax – after controlling for
horizontal inequity – is also sometimes referred to as the pure effect of taxation.
3 See, for example, Gastaldi and Liberati (2000).
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between two points in time, 1995 and 2000, and by using two microsimulation
models built upon the data from Bank of Italy for the same reference years.
This allows us to perform a microsimulation analysis of the redistributive
impact of two tax regimes using variable pretax income distributions, at the
same time disentangling the effects of both tax and nontax factors.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the main
adjustments of the personal income tax that occurred in Italy between 1995
and 2000. Section 3 deals with methodological issues in decomposing tax
revenue changes, implementing the OECD methodology. Section 4 extends
this methodology to redistributive issues. Section 5 deals with empirical issues
and discusses results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Main Adjustments of the Personal Income Tax in Italy,
1995--2000
The personal income tax was introduced in Italy in 1974 with 32 income
brackets and a top marginal tax rate equal to 82%. Since then, it has always
been the most important single source of tax revenue for the Italian budget,
representing a mounting share of GDP over the years (5.8% in 1980, 8.4%
in 1990, and 10.1% in 2000).4
Following a general trend in the most industrialized countries – mainly
originated by the U.S. tax reforms of the eighties – both the number of
brackets and the top marginal tax rates have been steadily reduced over
time, with a progressive shrinkage of the distance between the top and the
bottom marginal tax rates. Nevertheless, in 1983, the top marginal tax rate
was a nonnegligible 65%, and in 1995 it still was 51%.
One of the most important adjustments of the income tax of the last
decade occurred in 1998. The two years considered in this analysis (1995 and
2000) capture this change and fit perfectly with the above-mentioned trend,
as the top marginal tax rate was further reduced to 45.5%. At the same time,
4 Before the introduction of the modern personal income tax, labor income (from both
self-employed people and employees), entrepreneurial income (excluding companies),
and capital income were taxed by the imposta di ricchezza mobile with a slightly progres-
sive tax schedule and regardless of the personal conditions of the taxpayer. This tax was
the most important direct tax, in terms of tax revenue, from the end of the nineteenth
century to the time it was abolished. An additional tax – the imposta complementare pro-
gressiva – was also levied on incomes above a certain threshold. This latter tax was in fact
a personal tax, taking into account total family income and applied on a progressive scale
based on a formula with basic deductions. It is worth noting that this tax yielded low tax
revenues and was almost ineffective in reducing income inequalities. Other kinds of in-
come (basically incomes from land and from immovable property) were taxed with spe-
cific taxes on a “cadastral” basis.
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the bottom marginal tax rate was increased from 10% to 18.5% in the same
period, reducing the range to 27 percentage points.
The top left-hand side panel of table 1 shows that the increased bottom tax
rate of 18.5% encompasses all incomes that were previously taxed at both
10 and 22% and a small part of what was previously taxed (at the margin) at
27%. At the same time, in 2000, the top marginal tax rate of 45.5% includes
some incomes that were previously taxed at 41%.
Table 1
Main Parameters of 1995 and 2000 Tax Regimes (Values at current prices)
Marginal tax rates (∗) Tax credit for dependent spouse and dependent children (∗∗∗)
Tax rate in Tax rate in Euros in Euros in Euros inLower limit Upper limit Lower limit Upper limit
1995–1996–1997 1998–1999–2000 1995 1996–1997 1998–1999–2000
0 3,719 10 18.5 Spouse
3,719 7,437 22 18.5
7,437 7,747 27 18.5 0 15,494 422 546 522
7,747 15,494 27 26.5 15,494 30,987 422 497 502
15,494 30,987 34 33.5 30,987 51,646 422 460 465
30,987 69,722 41 39.5 51,646 ∞ 422 422 422
69,722 77,469 41 45.5
77,469 154,397 46 45.5 Children
154,397 ∞ 51 45.5
0 ∞ 49 174
(∗) Excluding the regional surtax (∗∗∗) For each child
Tax credit for employees (∗∗) Tax credit for self-employed
Euros in Euros in Euros in Euros inLower limit Upper limit Lower limit Upper limit
1995–1996–1997 1998–1999–2000 1995–1996–1997 1998–1999–2000
0 4,700 532 868 0 4,235 105 362
4,700 4,803 532 826 4,235 4,287 834 362
4,803 7,747 532 775 4,287 4,390 40 362
7,747 7,798 512 697 4,390 4,708 0 362
7,798 7,850 473 697 4,708 4,803 0 310
7,850 7,902 430 697 4,803 4,958 0 258
7,902 8,057 405 646 4,958 5,113 0 207
8,057 8,212 405 594 5,113 7,747 0 155
8,212 15,494 405 542 7,747 15,494 0 103
15,494 20,658 405 491 15,494 30,987 0 52
20,658 25,823 405 439
25,823 30,987 405 387
30,987 31,142 405 336
31,142 36,152 405 284
36,152 41,317 405 232
41,317 46,841 405 181
46,841 46,688 405 129
46,688 51,646 405 77
51,646 ∞ 405 52
(∗∗) In 1998, pensioners get a further specific tax credit of
36 euros for incomes below 9,296 euros.
Another important characteristic of the Italian tax system has always been
the presence of nonrefundable tax credits for earned incomes (in different
amounts for self-employed and employees) and for dependent children and
spouses (table 1, bottom panels). Again, the two years included in the analysis
make no exception for the use of these tools. After a long period in which
A Decomposition of the Personal Income Tax Changes in Italy: 1995--2000 91
the earned income tax credit was assigned on a flat basis, its structure was
made decreasing with increasing income in 1995. To offset for the increase
in the bottom marginal tax rate, the amount of earned income tax credit was
increased in 2000, still maintaining a decreasing profile. Note, however, that
above 30,000 euros of tax base the amount of tax credit for employees was less
generous in 2000 than it was in 1995. As reported in table 1, differentiation
with respect to income was much more refined in 2000, also for self-employed
taxpayers. Finally, in 2000, an additional tax credit of 36 euros was introduced
for pensioners with incomes below 9,296 euros.
Tax credits for dependent children and for dependent spouses are also
included in both tax systems. Table 1, in the top right-hand panel, shows
that while the tax credit for dependent children was significantly increased
in nominal terms (from 49 to 174 euros without income limits), the tax credit
for a dependent spouse was increased most at lower income levels in 1996
and was almost invariant afterwards. The total of all other admissible tax
credits (for interest expenses, insurance premiums, etc.) was finally reduced
from 22% to 19% of the total expenditures (not reported in table 1).
Finally, since 1998, Italy has applied a local surtax on personal incomes
that has replaced health contributions and a few minor local taxes. At the
regional level, the amount was initially set at a standard rate of 0.5% (0.9%
since 2001) with the option given to regions to increase the rate by up to 1
percentage point.
In the sequence of adjustments, one can perceive at least three aims of
the Italian tax reforms during the period observed. The first – and perhaps
the most widely debated – was the need to reduce the distortionary effects
of taxes on incentives to work. The reduction of the top marginal tax rates
has been a step in this direction. The second aim was to redistribute some
tax burden away from larger households, especially those with children.
This step was accomplished by increasing tax credits for dependent children,
possibly to encourage fertility and achieve demographic targets. The third
aim – following again a major trend in industrialized countries – was to use
the personal income tax to replace some grants paid to lower government
levels in order to reduce the occurrence of soft budget constraints at the local
level. Finally, all these targets have been constrained by the need for raising
sufficient tax revenues to meet the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and of
the Stability and Growth Pact. As a matter of fact, tax revenue from the
personal income tax increased by slightly more than 30 billion euros from
1995 to 2000 (from 83.2 to 113.6 billion euros).
Whether the government, by implementing these changes, succeeded in
shaping a more desirable tax regime is not crystal clear. From a social-welfare
perspective, Gastaldi and Liberati (2005) found ambiguous social-welfare
prescriptions on comparing the two tax regimes. From a descriptive point of
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view, Emiliani et al. (2004) argue that the total amount of redistribution in
the tax regime of 2000 is higher only because of a higher average tax rate (i.e.,
more resources were collected by the income tax) and not because of a higher
Kakwani index, i.e., a more disproportionate distribution of tax liabilities.
As it stands, the redistributive debate in Italy does not shed a clear light
on the relative merits of these two tax regimes, nor it does when comparing
alternative tax regimes in other years (Marino and Rapallini, 2003). In this
paper, we take a different perspective and add to the existing literature,
using 1995 and 2000 mainly as a laboratory, to show how the change of both
tax revenues and the redistributive effects of different tax regimes may be
shaped by the action of nontax factors.
3. Methodological Issues: Decomposing Tax Revenue Changes
The change in tax revenues between two points in time – especially in the
case of sufficiently large intervals – may be the result not only of changes
of tax laws but also of how the pretax income distribution varies over time.
There is indeed no doubt that a fixed tax system may give rise to different
tax revenues in the presence of a variable pretax income distribution. Also,
non-revenue-neutral tax systems give rise to different tax revenues when
applied to the same income distribution. The most common case is when
tax and nontax factors interact in shaping how much tax revenue different
tax regimes may extract from different populations. Therefore, a natural
question to ask is whether there exists a methodology to disentangle the
influences of the two.
This methodology has been developed by OECD (1987), which has identi-
fied the following set of factors that are potentially able to determine changes
in tax revenues: the number of taxpayers; the level of average income; the
distribution of income; inflationary fiscal drag; real fiscal drag; tax laws.
3.1. Number of Taxpayers (NT)
On average, the effect of changing the number of taxpayers can be re-
presented by a proportional increase of the income tax equal to the ratio
between the number of taxpayers in the final year observed and the number
of taxpayers in the base year. Considering 1995 as the base year and 2000 as
the final year, this ratio will be k = n00/n95, where n denotes the number of
taxpayers. The change of tax revenue due to NT can therefore be expressed
as follows:
NT = kT95(Y95) − T95(Y95) , (1)
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where Y95 denotes the pretax income distribution in 1995, and T95(Y95) is the
monetary value of the tax revenue obtained by applying the tax regime of
1995 (T95) to the income distribution Y95.
The expression (1) shows that the effect of changing the number of taxpay-
ers gives rise to an additional tax revenue that is measured by the difference
between a proportional scaling (k) of the original distribution of tax liabil-
ities and the original tax liabilities themselves.5 In principle, the NT effect
should exclude the variation of the number of taxpayers that is imputable to
tax laws (e.g., the change of the minimum taxable income or the definition
of dependent children or dependent spouse). Any such change, if resulting
from a change in legislation, should be included in the tax-law effect (see
below). Quite obviously, if the number of taxpayers were equal in the two
years, we would have k = 1 and NT = 0.
3.2. Average Income (AI)
Other things being equal, the variation of average income may cause tax
revenue to change. To quantify this effect, the following expression is used:
AI = gkT95(Y95) − kT95(Y95) , (2)
where g indicates the ratio between average incomes in the two periods and
the other symbols have the same meaning as in (1).
The expression (2) shows that the effect of a change of average income can
be measured by a proportional change of the tax revenue g. The additional
tax revenue imputable to a change of average income must indeed be at least
g times as much the tax revenue obtained in the absence of such a change.
This exhausts the change of tax revenue in the case of a proportional income
tax. It does not, however, if interactions with formal progressivity occur, for
in that case the average income growth may cause a more than proportional
increase of tax revenue.6 Obviously, if the average income does not grow
(i.e., g = 1), then AI = 0.
5 The additional tax revenue is therefore measured as if each taxpayer of the original dis-
tribution were counted k times. Obviously, this effect exhausts the change of tax revenue
in the (unlikely) case that the new population of taxpayers is an exact replica of the ori-
ginal one. In all other cases, a change in the number of taxpayers is likely to cause other
effects, e.g., altering the mean income or the way in which it is distributed.
6 Note that AI in (2) is measured over the changed number of taxpayers (implicit in k) to
capture the fact that average income may increase either because the income of existing
taxpayers increases or because new taxpayers enter the income distribution or for both
reasons.
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3.3. Income Distribution (ID)
The way in which pretax income is distributed may affect the amount of tax
revenue that any given tax regime may yield, other things being equal. This
effect is quantified as follows:
ID = gT95
(
Y00
g
)
− gkT95(Y95) . (3)
It is worthwhile exploring some characteristics of (3). This is best done by
assuming, for the moment, k = 1. In order to express the change in tax
revenue due to the way in which pretax income is distributed and not to its
mean, differences in mean incomes must be neutralized. Therefore, one must
compare the income distribution in the base period (Y95) with an equal-mean
income distribution in the final period. This latter is obtained by scaling all
incomes in year 2000 by g (the average income growth), which gives rise to
the distribution Y00/g. Obviously, there is no reason to expect Y00/g to be
distributed exactly in the same way as Y95, unless all incomes have grown
at the same rate. If yi95 = yi00/g ∀i (where yi denotes the income of the ith
taxpayer), a given income tax structure (T95) would produce exactly the same
tax revenue if applied to either Y95 or Y00/g, which implies gT95(Y00/g) =
gT95(Y95) and ID = 0. Therefore, with the same number of taxpayers, ID = 0
only when the new income distribution is a version of the original one scaled
by a constant factor g. If, instead, yi95 = yi00/g for at least one i, then ID = 0.
With a different number of taxpayers (k = 1), the expression (3) will be equal
to zero only when k = T95(Y00/g)T95(Y95) .
3.4. Fiscal Drag (FD)
The fiscal drag effect is quantified by the additional tax burden that is caused
by incomes falling into different income brackets (and therefore under dif-
ferent marginal tax rates). We have already observed [see (2) above] that
when incomes increase, tax revenue increases at least proportionally (this
is what is captured by AI). However, if incomes fall into different income
brackets as a consequence of their growth, fiscal drag effects occur because of
the interactions with tax progressivity. Formally, the additional tax revenue
due to fiscal drag is given by
FD = T95(Y00) − gT95
(
Y00
g
)
. (4)
Consider the first term on the RHS of (4). This is the straightforward result
of applying the 1995 tax regime to the income distribution of the year 2000.
Consider now the second term on the RHS of (4). Applying T95 to Y00 scaled
by g – as if income growth were absent – and multiplying the result by g gives
the tax revenue that T95 would have produced if it were a proportional tax.
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In this latter case, the application of a given tax regime to deflated incomes
(Y00/g) and the revaluation of all tax liabilities by g is equivalent to applying
that same tax regime directly to the nondeflated incomes (Y00), leading to
FD = 0. However, with a progressive tax (and g > 1), the first term will
generally be higher than the second one. Therefore, the difference between
the two gives the additional tax revenue generated by incomes falling in
higher brackets because of progressivity. The FD effect may be further split
into two parts: inflationary fiscal drag and real fiscal drag.
3.4.1. Inflationary Fiscal Drag (IFD)
This effect captures the variation of tax revenue due to incomes moving
across income brackets because of inflation. The following expression quan-
tifies IFD:
IFD = T95(Y00) − hT95
(
Y00
h
)
, (4a)
where h is the price index between the two years. The interpretation of (4a)
is analogous to that of (4), just replace g with h.
3.4.2. Real Fiscal Drag (RFD)
This effect isolates the additional tax revenue imputable to real income
growth. This is given by
RFD = hT95
(
Y00
h
)
− gT95
(
Y00
g
)
. (4b)
The interpretation of (4b) is now straightforward, as it is obtained by sub-
tracting the inflationary fiscal drag (4a) from the total fiscal drag effect (4).
Since the income distribution is scaled by inflation in the first term and by
total growth (inflation + real) in the second term, the difference must be the
additional tax revenue due to real income growth. Obviously, if the growth
is only inflationary (i.e., g = h), then RFD = 0.
3.5. Tax Law (TL)
It is worth noting that until now, all effects have been calculated by apply-
ing T95 – the tax regime of the base period – to various income distributions.
This means that all effects quantify changes of tax revenue imputable to
nontax factors. The tax-law effect, instead, isolates the impact of tax factors;
consequently it neutralizes any tax revenue change that is due to the action
of nontax factors. It is given by
TL = T00(Y00) − T95(Y00) . (5)
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The interpretation of (5) is obvious. It will be equal to zero only when the
tax regime is either unchanged or revenue-neutral.7
In summary, the change in tax revenue, ∆T, will be
∆T = T00(Y00) − T95(Y95) = NT + AI + ID + IFD + RFD + TL . (6)
4. Methodological Issues: Decomposing the Redistributive Effect
The methodology proposed by OECD (1987) to break up tax revenue
changes is now extended to encompass a decomposition of the total re-
distributive change occurring between 1995 and 2000. This is done by using
the Reynolds–Smolensky index (RS), obtained as the difference between the
Gini indices of the distribution before and after a given tax change.8
Compared with other indices, RS is particularly useful in that it can be
further decomposed to consider how much of the total redistributive change
is due to the amount of tax resources collected (the size of the redistri-
bution) and how much of that same effect is due to a nonproportional
way of collecting them (the degree of progressivity of taxation).9 The main
shortcoming of this latter decomposition is that a residual term may ap-
pear.10
Using RS requires first measuring the Gini indices of pretax and after-tax
inequality of income distributions in both 1995 and 2000. In each year, one
has
RS = GYxx − GYxx−Txx = τTxxΠTxx − Rxx , (7)
where xx denotes either 95 or 00. This expression defines the RS index
and its decomposition. This latter is given by the product of the implicit
average tax rate (τTxx ≡ tTxx1−tTxx ) and the Kakwani index (ΠTxx), where, in turn,
the general definition of the average tax rate is tTxx = Txx(Yxx)Yxx .11 The implicit
average tax rate τTxx measures the size of the redistribution (how much
income is redistributed); the Kakwani index measures how disproportional
the income tax is in comparison to the benchmark case of a proportional
income tax.
7 In this latter case, it is likely there will be effects on the redistribution side (see be-
low). It will become clearer in the empirical section that TL encompasses the constant-
population methodology.
8 See Reynolds and Smolensky (1977).
9 See Kakwani (1977) and Kakwani (1984) for the consideration of a reranking term.
10 Extensions to other inequality indices is straightforward, but is not pursued in this paper,
as the main point is clearly achieved by using the RS index.
11 Note that the implicit average tax rate is therefore given by the ratio of the average tax
rate to one minus the average tax rate, as required by the decomposition in (7). See Lam-
bert (1993).
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The Kakwani index is obtained as the difference between the concentra-
tion coefficient of the income tax and the Gini index of the pretax income
distribution:12
ΠTxx = CTxx − GTxx . (8)
With a proportional income tax, CTxx = GTxx. As a consequence, ΠTxx = 0.
With a progressive income tax, CTxx > GYxx, as a progressive tax is more con-
centrated than the initial incomes. Therefore the Kakwani index is positive
and increases with the progressivity of the income tax.
Finally, the term on the far right of (7) is the reranking effect (Rxx),
which measures the change of the relative position of taxpayers after the
income tax, compared to their position before it. Note that as Rxx > 0, it
subtracts from the total redistributive effect, because the product of the
implicit average tax rate and the Kakwani index includes some redistribution
that simply derives from switching the relative positions of individuals. The
reranking effect may also be interpreted as a part of a wider horizontal
inequity effect, which includes unequal treatment of equals that does not
cause reranking.13
Now, when applying the methodology of section 2 to redistributive issues,
it is necessary to convert tax revenue changes into changes of the redistribu-
tive outcome. Comparing the two tax regimes selected in this paper, the
redistributive change ∆RS can be given the following expression:
∆RS = [GY00 − GY00−T00 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
RST00
−[GY95 − GY95−T95 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
RST95
. (9)
This expression simply describes the fact that the application of T00 and
T95 to the corresponding income distributions (Y00 and Y95) gives rise to
two redistributive outcomes (RST00 and RST95 ). The difference between the
two measures is ∆RS. Now, analogously to the decomposition of tax rev-
enue changes, ∆RS may be decomposed into the same factors: number
of taxpayers, average income, income distribution, fiscal drags, and tax
laws.
12 Just recall that, in this case, the concentration coefficient must be measured on the pretax
income distribution.
13 See Aronson et al. (1994) – in particular the graphical tool of overlapping and nonover-
lapping “fans.” The decomposition of the redistributive effect into horizontal, vertical,
and reranking effects is not pursued in this paper. The reason is that this further decom-
position does not help isolate the effects of nontax factors from those of tax changes.
Rather, it would be a further step in explaining the effects due to tax changes, which has
however no immediate relevance to the purpose of this paper.
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4.1. Number of Taxpayers (NT)
The redistributive consequence of a change in the number of taxpayers (NT)
is expressed by14:
∆RSNT = (GY95 − GY95−kT95 ) − (GY95 − GY95−T95 )
= (τkT95 ΠY95kT95
) − (τT95 ΠY95T95 ) . (10)
In (10), τkT95 = tkT951−tkT95 is the implicit average tax rate arising from the dis-
tribution of kT95, where tkT95 = kT95(Y95)Y95 is the average tax rate obtained by
dividing the tax revenue of 1995 – after multiplying all tax liabilities by k
– by the pretax income distribution of the same year (Y95). Analogously,
τT95 = tT951−tT95 is the implicit average tax rate arising from the distribution of
T95, where tT95 = T95(Y95)Y95 is the average tax rate obtained by dividing the tax
revenue of 1995 by the corresponding pretax income distribution.15
According to (8), the two Kakwani indices of (10) can be further expanded:
Π
Y95
kT95
= CY95kT95 − GY95 ,
Π
Y95
T95 = CY95T95 − GY95 . (10a)
Now, it is worth noting that ΠY95kT95 = ΠY95T95 . The ways in which T95 and kT95
are distributed on Y95 is indeed the same, as the latter set of tax liabilities
is only a proportionally scaled version of the former one. The concentration
coefficient is therefore the same in both cases. Therefore, a change of the
number of taxpayers isolates an average tax rate effect and not a Kakwani
effect, as the change of the Kakwani index will be zero.
4.2. Average Income (AI)
The redistributive effect of a change of average income is identified by the
following expression:16
∆RSAI =
(
τgkT95 Π
Y95
gkT95
) − (τkT95 ΠY95kT95) . (11)
14 Note that, in what follows, concentration coefficients and Kakwani indices will appear
with both a subscript and a superscript. The subscript indicates the variable whose con-
centration is measured, while the superscript indicates the variable on which the concen-
tration is calculated. For example, ΠY95T95 denotes the concentration of taxes paid in 1995
on the pretax income distribution of the same year. The Gini index does not need a dou-
ble indicator, as the variable whose concentration is measured and that on which the con-
centration is measured are the same. All formulas below, to save notation, omit indicat-
ing the difference between the corresponding reranking terms, but all must be taken as
including a term ∆R.
15 Different implicit tax rates across the elements of the decomposition will therefore arise
according to what distribution of taxes is taken into account and to what is the proper in-
come distribution at the denominator.
16 The difference between Gini indices as in (10) is omitted for simplicity. Full details of for-
mulas are given in table 3.
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Again, one can note that also in this case the two Kakwani indices are
equal. Indeed,
Π
Y95
gkT95
= CY95gkT95 − GY95 ,
Π
Y95
kT95
= CY95kT95 − GY95 , (11a)
from which it is clear that the tax concentration coefficients are equal, as the
two distributions of tax liabilities differ only by a scalar g. The Gini index
of the pretax income distribution is also the same. Therefore, as before,
the average income effect embodies only an average-tax-rate effect, as the
change of the Kakwani index is zero.
Implicit average tax rates, in this case, are instead based on the following
average tax rates: tgkT95 = gkT95(Y95)Y95 and tkT95 =
kT95(Y95)
Y95
.
4.3. Income Distribution (ID)
The effect of a change of the way in which income is distributed is measured
as follows:
∆RSID =
(
τgT95 Π
Y00/g
gT95
) − (τgkT95 ΠY95gkT95 ) . (12)
In turn, the two Kakwani indices are defined by the following expressions:
Π
Y00/g
gT95 = CY00/ggT95 − GY00/g ,
Π
Y95
gkT95 = CY95gkT95 − GY95 . (12a)
In this case the Gini indices of the two pretax income distributions differ.
These have the same mean, but can obviously differ in the way income
is distributed, unless all incomes have grown at the same rate. It follows
that the ways in which gkT95 and gT95 are distributed on two different pretax
income distributions are likely to be different, leading to a different Kakwani
index. Implicit average tax rates, in this case, are calculated on the basis of
tgT95 = gT95(Y00/g)Y00/g and tgkT95 =
gkT95(Y95)
Y95
. Therefore, the redistributive impact of
a change of the way income is distributed contains both an average tax rate
and a Kakwani effect. It is also worth noting that the Kakwani effect is
imputable partly to different pretax income distributions and partly to the
way in which the tax is distributed.
4.4. Fiscal Drag
4.4.1. Inflationary Fiscal Drag (IFD)
The redistributive impact of IFD is given by
∆RSIFD =
(
τT95 Π
Y00
T95
) − (τhT95 ΠY00/hhT95 ) . (13)
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In this case, the Kakwani indices assume the following form:
Π
Y00
T95 = CY00T95 − GY00 ,
Π
Y00/h
hT95
= CY00/hhT95 − GY00/h . (13a)
In (13a), the Gini index of the pretax income distributions is the same, as
Y00/h is only a scaled version of the original Y00; but the concentration
coefficients of taxes will differ, leading to different Kakwani indices. Implicit
average tax rates are in this case based on tT95 = T95(Y00)Y00 and thT95 =
hT95(Y00/h)
Y00/h
.
Therefore IFD will have both a Kakwani effect and an implicit average-tax-
rate effect, but note that the Kakwani effect is only imputable to different
concentration coefficients of taxes. Quite obviously, these effects disappear
if h = 1.
4.4.2. Real Fiscal Drag (RFD)
The change of the redistributive impact of RFD is measured as follows:
∆RSRFD =
(
τhT95 Π
Y00/h
hT95
) − (τgT95ΠY00/ggT95 ) , (14)
where the Kakwani indices are
Π
Y00/h
hT95
= CY00/hhT95 − GY00/h ,
Π
Y00/g
gT95 = CY00/ggT95 − GY00/g . (14a)
The Gini indices of the pretax income distributions are again the same, as
both are obtained by scaling the original distribution by either a factor h or
a factor g. However, the tax concentration coefficients are different, unless
h = g. The Kakwani indices will therefore be different. Again, the change of
the Kakwani index is entirely imputable to the change of the concentration
coefficients and not to the inequality of the corresponding pretax income
distribution. Implicit average tax rates will also differ, as they are based on
thT95 = hT95(Y00/h)Y00/h and tgT95 =
gT95(Y00/g)
Y00/g
. As in the previous case, the change of
the redistributive impact caused by RFD will therefore be a mixture of the
change of the implicit average tax rate and the change of the Kakwani effect.
4.5. Tax Law (TL)
Finally, the tax-law effect may be quantified as follows:
∆RSTL =
(
τT00Π
Y00
T00 ) − (τT95ΠY00T95
)
, (15)
with the two Kakwani indices defined by
Π
Y00
T00 = CY00T00 − GY00 ,
Π
Y00
T95 = CY00T95 − GY00 . (16)
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The Gini indices of (16) are obviously the same. However, it is likely that
T95 and T00 are distributed in different ways. This entails different Kakwani
indices, because of different concentration coefficients. Note that this differ-
ence is now entirely imputable to changes in tax regimes and not to variations
of the pretax income distributions. Furthermore, if the two tax regimes are
not revenue-neutral, the implicit average tax rates will also be different,
being based on tT00 = T00(Y00)Y00 and tT95 =
T95(Y00)
Y00
.
Table 2, for each effect, summarizes the presence of an implicit average-
tax-rate effect and of the Kakwani effect in shaping the change of the redis-
tributive impact, as well as which factors (pretax income distribution and/or
tax concentration) contribute to determining the Kakwani index. Table 3
summarizes all formulas so far discussed. Analogously to (6), the total change
of the redistributive impact may be written as
∆RS = ∆RSNT +∆RSAI +∆RSID + ∆RSIFD + ∆RSRFD +∆RSTL . (17)
Table 2
Decomposition of the Redistributive Impact and Effects Involved
Does pre-tax Does taxImplicit average incomeEffect Kakwani effect concentrationtax rate effect distribution affect affect Kakwani?Kakwani?
Number of taxpayers (NT) Yes No – –
Average income (AI) Yes No – –
Income distribution (ID) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inflationary fiscal drag (IFD) Yes Yes No Yes
Real fiscal drag (RFD) Yes Yes No Yes
Tax law (TL) Yes Yes No Yes
5. Empirical Results
5.1. Data and Microsimulation Models
The results of the decomposition of both tax revenue and redistribution are
obtained by using two static microsimulation models. Both are built using the
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) by the Bank of Italy on
net incomes. This entails introducing a grossing-up procedure to reconstruct
gross incomes from the net ones according to the tax legislation prevailing in
each year. One model (AWARETAX) is built using SHIW 1995; the second
model (TAXPOL) is built using SHIW 2000.
Both models use a detailed set of information on households, including in-
comes, demographic structures, and other sociodemographic variables. Both
models produce a set of taxpayers with information on taxable incomes,
gross taxes, tax credits, the imputation of the main cash benefits (e.g., child
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benefits) on the expenditure side, and all other required parameters able to
shape the tax liability (e.g., interest expenses).17 In this respect, the informa-
tion embodied in the two models is the widest possible, as each record of
the file is a single taxpayer. On the other hand, no behavioral reactions have
been included in the two models for the purpose of this paper, as behavioral
reactions are to some extent embodied in the fact that this microsimulation
analysis is based on a variable pretax income distributions between the two
years.18
Table 4 reports the main summary statistics of the two SHIW waves and
the basic outcomes of the two microsimulation models, as well as the official
data on tax revenues, to examine the degree of proximity of our estimates to
the actual tax figures.
Table 4
Summary Statistics
AWARETAX TAXPOL
(1995) (2000)
Number of observations on individuals 23,924 22,269
Number of observations on households 8,135 8,001
Weighted number of individuals 56,582,937 56,518,384
Weighted number of households 19,599,998 20,782,701
Average household size 2.88 2.72
Estimated personal income tax (billions of euros) 77.3 108.0
Actual income tax revenue (billions of euros) 83.2 113.6
Number of taxpayers (millions) 36.5 37.8
Source: Authors’ calculations on AWARETAX and TAXPOL.
5.2. Specific Redistributive Issues
Unlike the case of tax revenue, in which the decomposition has an aggregate
nature, the redistributive decomposition requires us to state across whom re-
distribution is measured and, consequently, what is the appropriate indicator
of living standard to compare households.
The choice adopted in this paper falls on household incomes. This proced-
ure is rather standard in the redistributive literature, and also recommended;
17 No use is made of detailed tax files, as they are not for public use.
18 On the use and aims of microsimulation techniques, see the recent book by Gupta and
Kapur (2000).
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it aims at verifying the impact of tax policies on the most comprehensive unit
of analysis.19
As is well known, with the household as a unit of analysis, nominal incomes
cannot be taken as a proper variable to measure redistribution, as households
differ in size and composition. A high nominal income may be shared among
a large number of household members, giving rise to a low standard of living.
For this reason, the measure of well-being is taken to be equivalent household
incomes obtained by deflating nominal incomes by an equivalence scale.20
All redistributive outcomes, therefore, will be measured on a distribution
of equivalent incomes; this entails that equivalent incomes will provide the
basis for the calculation of both the average tax rates and the Kakwani indices
summarized in table 3.
5.3. Decomposing the Change of Tax Revenue
Table 5 reports the outcome of the decomposition of tax revenue changes,
according to the methodology developed in section 3. The estimated absolute
tax revenue change is about 30 billion euros. This is equivalent to an increase
of about 2.1 percentage points in the total average tax burden.
The greatest contribution to the change of tax revenue is imputable to
the increase of average income (about 16.6 billion euros – slightly more than
half of the total change). A significant part (about 24%) of the additional
tax revenue arises from total fiscal drag, both inflationary (7.2 billion euros)
and real (4.6 billion euros). Smaller positive contributions also arise from
the income distribution effect (4 billion euros) and from the change of the
number of taxpayers (2.9 billion euros, 10% of the total change). Adding up
all these positive figures gives rise to a total effect of more than 35 billion
euros. It must therefore be that changes of tax laws have pushed tax revenue
downward. This is indeed reported in table 5, where the effect of tax law
enters with a negative sign (−4.7 billion euros).
The decomposition of the tax revenue change gives interesting insights.
The first, somewhat expected, is that external factors have pushed tax rev-
enue upwards, but this has occurred at the same time as an announced policy
choice of reducing it. In other words, without the negative contribution of
TL, the increase of tax revenue would have been larger. The usefulness of
this methodology appears clearly from the previous decomposition, as it
neatly disentangles the intended effects of tax policies from the influence of
all other factors indirectly affecting the functioning of the tax systems.
19 See, for example, the document by the Canberra Group (2001).
20 The equivalence scale chosen is the OECD scale that assigns the value 1 to the first mem-
ber of the household, 0.7 to all other adults, and 0.5 to children.
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Table 5
The Decomposition of the Change of Tax Revenue
(billions of euros)
Estimated tax revenue 1995 (a) 77.3
Estimated tax revenue 2000 (b) 108.0
Estimated tax revenue change 30.6
Actual tax revenue change (c) 30.4
Average tax rate in 1995 18.1
Average tax rate in 2000 20.1
Change of average tax rate (percentage points) 2.1
Decomposition of estimated tax revenue change
Number of taxpayers (NT) 2.9
Average income (NT) 16.6
Income distribution (ID) 4.0
Inflationary fiscal drag (IFD) 7.2
Real fiscal drag (RFD) 4.6
Tax law (TL) −4.7
Parameters used to calculate the decomposition
Number of taxpayers in 1995 36,452,716
Number of taxpayers in 2000 37,836,428
Total average income in 1995 (euros) 11,748
Total average income in 2000 (euros) 14,177
k (number of taxpayers 2000 over number of taxpayers 1995) 1.04
g (average income 2000 over average income 1995) 1.21
h (price index 2000, 1995=1) 1.12
(a) Estimates by AWARETAX
(b) Estimates by TAXPOL
(c) Official Italian figures, RGSEP corresponding years
Source: Authors’ calculations on AWARETAX and TAXPOL.
The second interesting insight can be gained by comparing the effects of
tax changes (TL) with the additional tax revenue caused by inflation (IFD).
Consider the following line of reasoning. If T00 were a perfect indexation of
T95 (and nothing else), the reduction of tax revenue imputable to TL should
have been of the same magnitude as IFD with an opposite sign (−7.2 billion
euros). This point can be best illustrated by further decomposing TL. Ideally,
changes in tax law can be split between those needed to provide indexation
of the existing system and those implemented to change the tax structure. In
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symbols,
TL = TL(I) + TL(S)
= [TI95(Y00) − T95(Y00)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TL(I)
+ [T00(Y00) − TI95(Y00)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
TL(S)
, (18)
where TI95 denotes the indexed 1995 tax regime, i.e., the tax system pre-
vailing in 1995 with all monetary parameters upgraded to take account of
inflation.
The first term on the RHS of (18), TL(I), is therefore the change in tax
revenue that would have occurred if the tax system of 1995 were only indexed.
Obviously, with zero inflation we have TL(I) = 0, as TI95 = T95. In general,
with positive inflation we have TL(I) < 0; i.e., with progressivity, indexation
must raise less tax revenue than leaving the tax system unchanged in nominal
terms. Therefore, the negative magnitude of TL(I) denotes how much of the
additional tax revenue raised by IFD is actually compensated by indexation.
With perfect indexation, TL(I) = IFD in absolute values.
The second term of (18), TL(S), is instead the change of tax revenue that
can be imputed to a variation of the tax structure beyond what is needed
for indexation. If the new tax system were only an indexed version of the
old one, then TL(S) = 0. If not, the sign of the change of tax revenue will
obviously depend on how tax parameters are changed.
The expression (18) may help to interpret the meaning of the TL effect of
−4.7 billion euros in table 5. Now, if the tax system of 1995 were only indexed
to inflation, then TL = TL(I), and the reduction of tax revenue would have
been 7.2 billion euros. Since TL = −4. 7, either T00 is less than a perfect
indexation of T95 or the implicit TL(S) is a positive 2.5 billion euros, which
means that the policymaker has eroded part of what it would have given
back to taxpayers with a perfectly indexed tax system.
The decomposition of (18) also provides a third interesting insight of
the exercise, which is methodological. It should indeed be clear, now, that
the widely used constant-population methodology corresponds to what is
measured as TL(S) in (18). That term measures the performance of different
tax systems, whose tax parameters are expressed in real terms with respect
to a base year and whose effects are compared on the income distribution of
that same year.
5.4. Decomposing the Change of the Redistributive Impact
The extension of the previous methodology to a redistributive decomposition
is illustrated in table 6. The first part of the table recalls the values of the
Gini index (of both gross and net incomes) in both 1995 and 2000 (with
five decimals) and introduces the corresponding confidence intervals at 95%
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Table 6
The Decomposition of Redistributive Changes
1995 2000 Changes
Gini index of gross incomes 0.37305 0.38860
Confidence interval 0.37297 0.37313 0.38849 0.38871
Gini index of net incomes 0.34251 0.34950
Confidence interval 0.34243 0.34259 0.34940 0.34959
Total redistributive impact 0.03054 0.03910 0.008562
Confidence interval 0.03052 0.03056 0.03908 0.03913 0.008558 0.008568
Implicit average tax rate 0.180 0.235 0.0550
Kakwani index 0.192 0.182 −0.0103
Reranking −0.0040 −0.0036 0.0004
Change of Reynolds– Change of implicit Change of Kakwani indexSmolensky index (∆RS) average tax rate
Total changes 0.0086 0.0550 −0.0103
Number of taxpayers (NT) 0.0013 0.007 0.0000
Average income (AI) 0.0078 0.049 0.0000
Income distribution (ID) 0.0074 0.037 −0.0037
Inflationary fiscal drag (IFD) −0.0062 −0.015 −0.0148
Real fiscal drag (RFD) −0.0041 −0.010 −0.0110
Tax law (TL) 0.0023 −0.013 0.0191
Source: Authors’ calculations on AWARETAX and TAXPOL.
calculated following the methodology developed by Ogwang (2000) and
based on the jackknife standard errors. The confidence intervals are very
narrow.
The summary figures of the corresponding redistributive impacts, again
with the associated standard errors, are also shown. Also in this case, the
confidence intervals are very narrow. The total redistributive impact has
increased from 0.03054 (T95 on Y95) to 0.03910 (T00 on Y00), corresponding
to a change of 0.008562 points of the Gini index.
In aggregate, this increase has been driven by a significant increase of the
implicit average tax rate (from 18% to 23.5%) that more than compensates
the reduction of the Kakwani index from 0.192 to 0.182. A rough interpre-
tation of this decomposition is that T00 is a less disproportional regime than
T95, but with a higher implicit average tax rate. The main aim of the following
decomposition is to understand in more detail how much of this total effect
is imputable to changes of tax law and how much of it is imputable to nontax
factors.
Moving to the decomposition – reported in the second panel of table 6 –
the picture is indeed more interesting. The first row summarizes the changes
to be explained by the decomposition. As in the case of tax revenue, there
are a number of issues that merit discussion.
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5.4.1. Average Income
One of the most important positive contributions to the change of the redis-
tributive impact comes from average income (0.0078). However, this contri-
bution emerges exclusively from a higher average tax rate (4.9 percentage
points), for the change of the Kakwani index is zero in this case (recall
table 2). This is quite obvious, as the relevant taxes in calculating this effect
are those of 1995 scaled by k and g, on the one hand, and those of 1995 scaled
by k, on the other hand. As g is greater than 1, the total amount of taxes
should increase at least by this factor. But since the original tax liabilities
are all scaled proportionally, the concentration coefficient of taxes does not
change, and the Kakwani index stays the same.
5.4.2. Number of Taxpayers
A similar line of reasoning applies to the case of the number of taxpayers
(whose contribution is 0.0013). Again, it is the average tax rate that drives
the increase in the redistributive impact, as the change in the Kakwani index
is again zero. In this case, however, the positive contribution is lower than in
the case of average income, as k is still greater than 1 but much lower than g
(1.04 and 1.21, respectively – recall table 5).
5.4.3. Income Distribution
More interesting is the analysis of the income distribution effect, which also
contributes positively to the measured redistributive change (0.0074). This
positive change is again partially explained by the impulse of the average tax
rate (3.7 percentage points). This depends on the fact that incomes scaled
by g, evidently, reallocate themselves across income brackets in a revenue-
increasing way compared with the distribution of incomes in 1995. On the
other hand, there is a slight negative impulse originating from a lower Kak-
wani index (−0.004). Quite interestingly, this lower Kakwani index is not
imputable to the way in which the tax liabilities of 1995 are concentrated, as
the tax concentration coefficient (not reported in table 6) is indeed higher
when the 1995 tax regime is applied to Y00/g (0.577) than when it is applied
to Y95 (0.565). Rather, the overall effect is driven by the higher inequality
of the (pretax) income distribution Y00/g – as measured by the Gini index
(0.389) – compared with the inequality of the (pretax) income distribution
Y95 (whose Gini index is 0.373). Therefore, it is this higher inequality of the
pretax income distribution that drives down the disproportionality of T95
when applied to Y00/g. In any case, it must be that a higher proportion of
taxes falls on the lowest part of the income distribution, if one has to have
a less disproportional distribution. However, this negative impulse does not
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outweigh the positive impulse of the higher average tax rate, so that the total
redistributive change is positive.
5.4.4. Inflationary Fiscal Drag
The redistributive power of fiscal drag merits particular attention. In both
cases (real and inflationary), its contribution to the total redistributive effect
is negative. Consider first the inflationary fiscal drag (IFD). In table 6, its
overall impact is −0.0062, i.e., it contributes negatively to redistribution.
A reduction of both the implicit average tax rate and the Kakwani index
now drives this outcome.
With regard to the implicit average tax rate, the meaning of a negative
change may be better explained by observing the behavior of the corres-
ponding numerators, (average tax rates) in the case of IFD (table 3):21
tT95 − thT95 =
T95(Y00)
Y00
− hT95(Y00/h)
Y00/h
. (19)
Now, at lower income levels, scaling incomes by h is likely to make scaled
incomes fall in lower tax brackets or have the right to larger amounts of tax
deductions and/or tax credits, if these latter are inversely related to income.
Therefore, h times the tax paid on scaled incomes is always lower than the
tax paid on nominal incomes, when there is inflation and tax progressivity.
This entails that the numerator of the second term on the RHS of (18) is
everywhere smaller than the numerator of the first term. This is consistent
with the idea – and with our previous findings in table 5 – that inflationary
fiscal drag causes an increase of the absolute amount of tax revenue, unless
the income tax is proportional, in which case both numerators provide the
same tax revenue. But in general, T95(Y00) > hT95(Y00/h).
Consider now the denominators of the two terms of (18). As the calcula-
tion is made by scaling all incomes by h, with inflation the denominator on
the RHS of (18) will be lower than the denominator of the RHS by a factor
h. This will hold in aggregate and for every single income.
Therefore, in aggregate, the sign of (18) will depend on the rate of change
of the numerator in the two alternatives, because that of the denominator is
h in both. The conclusion is that the sign will be positive if the ratio between
T95(Y00) and hT95(Y00/h) is greater than h, and negative in the opposite case.
A natural question to ask now is who are those taxpayers for whom the
numerator grows faster than h, which leads to a positive difference between
average tax rates. In order to explore this issue (and to interpret the negative
change of the implicit average tax rate) it is worth observing that the ratio
21 Just recall that the average tax rates involved in the redistributive outcome are expressed
in equivalent figures.
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between T95(Y00) and hT95(Y00/h) does not behave in the same way across
taxpayers. First, this ratio tends asymptotically to 1 for very large incomes.
The intuition is simple. In the case of a very rich individual, most of the
income falls in the area of proportionality beyond the top marginal tax rate,
so that the additional tax she pays with a nonindexed tax system is a very
tiny fraction of the total amount of tax. In this case, the absolute amount of
taxes grows slower than income, i.e., slower than h.
The opposite occurs at lower levels of income. With progressivity, a non-
indexed tax system makes the absolute amount of taxes grow faster than
income, i.e., T95(Y00) grows faster than h, which means that the additional
tax revenue is a significant fraction of the total amount of tax.
Therefore, the negative change of the (implicit) average tax rate in table 6
must be the result of matching a number of taxpayers for whom the (implicit)
average tax rate increases and a number of taxpayers for whom the (implicit)
average tax rate decreases. The final result will depend on these two opposing
forces. In the case of table 6, the negative contribution of the implicit average
tax rate means that there are more people for whom the additional tax would
grow slower than income in the switch from a perfectly indexed tax regime
applied to real incomes to a nonindexed tax regime applied to nominal
incomes.
Note again that the appearance of a negative sign on the change of the
average tax rate is perfectly compatible with the fact that inflation – with
progressivity – increases tax liabilities of all taxpayers, the difference being
in the rate of growth of this increase. In other words, all taxpayers are hurt by
the fact that the tax system is not indexed, but some are hurt proportionally
more than others.
Finally, the change of the Kakwani index in IFD is negative (−0.015),
which means that T95(Y00) behave in a less disproportional way than
hT95(Y00/h). This is a direct consequence of the previous discussion. If taxes
grow more than proportionally at lower income levels, a nonindexed tax
system will impose a greater share of total taxes on low-income households.
Indeed, the reduction of the Kakwani index is now entirely driven by a lower
tax concentration coefficient (0.566 against 0.551 – not reported in table 6),
as the Gini indices of Y00 and Y00/h are the same. The effect of inflation, as
expected, is therefore that of making the tax system less disproportional.22
5.4.5. Real Fiscal Drag
An analogous line of reasoning holds for the real fiscal drag; therefore the is-
sue will not be discussed any further. Note that also in this case, the changes of
22 For an analysis of the impact of inflation on income taxes in a wider perspective, see Im-
mervoll (2000).
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both the implicit average tax rate (−0.010) and the Kakwani index (−0.011)
are negative. It is of some interest to note that the sum of the changes induced
by inflationary fiscal drag and real fiscal drag amounts to −0.01 points of the
Gini index, which is more than the total (positive) change ∆RS (0.0086). This
implies that the positive contributions of all other effects have to compensate
the loss determined by the total fiscal drag.
5.4.6. Tax Law
Finally, the tax-law effect contributes positively to the change of the redis-
tributive impact by 0.0023 points. Note that this outcome is only slightly more
than one-fourth of the total redistributive change. In this case, the direction
of the average tax rate and that of the Kakwani index conflict. The implicit
average tax rate actually declines (−0.013), signaling that tax changes have
contributed to reducing the tax burden, a result already captured by the
decomposition of tax revenue changes, in which case the contribution was
also negative. The change of the Kakwani index is instead positive, which
implies that the tax structure of the year 2000 (T00) is more disproportional
than T95 when applied to the same income distribution (Y00). As the initial
income distribution is the same, the change of the Kakwani index is entirely
driven by a change of the tax concentration coefficient, which is higher for
T00 than for T95 (0.570 against 0.551 – not reported in table 6). This positive
impulse outweighs the negative contribution of the implicit average tax rate
in shaping the total redistributive change associated with changes in tax law.
Of particular importance is again the size of the impact of tax-law changes.
This positive contribution (in absolute values) is much lower than the nega-
tive contribution imputable to IFD – slightly more than one-third of it. This
means that, on the redistribution side, the tax regime of the year 2000 is not
even sufficient to recover the negative effect of inflation. In other terms, the
tax regime of 2000 is not equivalent to a perfect indexation of T95 in terms
of redistributive outcomes.23
This is actually the most striking result of the analysis. If use had been made
of a fixed pretax income distribution, the only possible conclusion would have
been that the redistributive power of the tax system had improved between
1995 and 2000. With our methodology, this conclusion can be accommodated
by the observation that this improvement is only about one-fourth of the total
redistributive change over the period and that the positive contribution of
changes of tax regimes is only slightly more than one-third of the perverse
23 The sensitivity of results has been tested by reversing the exercise, i.e., by assessing tax
revenue and redistributive effects going from 2000 to 1995 (data not reported in text).
This amounts to changing the base of the exercise. As expected, it changes the absolute
size of the effects but not their relative weight.
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effect of inflation. It implies that, other things being equal, changes of tax
systems from 1995 to 2000 did not even recover the loss of the redistributive
power caused by the implicit choice of not indexing the 1995 tax system.
6. Conclusions
Using a methodology proposed by OECD (1987), this paper has imple-
mented a decomposition of the change of the redistributive effect of two
tax regimes in Italy. This procedure is innovative, in that it allows one to
take into account the contributions of both tax and nontax factors in shaping
redistributive outcomes and thereby to move beyond the traditional ways in
which redistribution analysis is carried out in a microsimulation context.
Some interesting insights emerge from the analysis. First, it highlights that
nonnegligible increases in tax revenue may be obtained by the action of non-
tax factors while at the same time the revealed choice may be to push taxes
downward. Obviously, such a tax policy choice could be justified by the fact
that reducing taxes may be required to compensate for the natural increase
of tax revenue imputable to some external factors (e.g., average income).
Whatever the direction of causality might be, it is particularly interesting
that even in periods of low inflation, the lack of indexation of the personal
income tax may result in heavy additional tax burdens. About one-fourth of
the additional tax revenue in the period, indeed, can be imputed to the action
of inflation. On the tax-revenue side, neutrality to inflation would require
that the intended reduction in taxes be at least equal, in absolute terms, to
the increase in taxes generated by inflation. The paper shows that this is
not the case if one considers the interval between 1995 and 2000. The tax
reduction embodied in the tax structure prevailing in 2000 is indeed less than
the tax increase embodied in inflation. On the redistributive side, inflation is
thought to be more harmful at low income levels, where nominal increases
may cause incomes to rise into brackets with higher marginal tax rates. More
important is the fact that changes of tax laws are not able to compensate this
negative redistributive effect. Their contribution is indeed positive, but less
than what would be required to neutralize the adverse impact of inflation,
which is instead compensated by the action of other, nontax factors. This
marks an important step in the study of the redistributive effects of public
policies, which is of wide interest, as it shows how meaningless might be the
comparison of the effect of the personal income tax over time in a given
country or across countries when the pretax income distribution changes.
Confining ourselves to the total redistributive change, we would have con-
cluded that T00 is more redistributive than T95. Using a fixed pretax income
distribution, we would have concluded that T00 is again more redistributive
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than T95, but by much less. The analysis proposed in this paper has allowed
us to shed some light on the fact that the contribution of tax factors is just
one-fourth of the total redistributive change and it does not compensate the
perverse effect of inflation – quite a different picture of the effects of the
personal income tax in Italy.
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